MIT Press Ltd Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, Volume 2

For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways.In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers fromincorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophershave drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology toinform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and thesethree volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologistsin this emerging interdisciplinary field. The contributors to volume 2 discuss recent empiricalresearch that uses the diverse methods of cognitive science to investigate moral judgments,emotions, and actions. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, anda reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include moral intuitions as a kind of fastand frugal heuristics, framing effects in moral judgments, an analogy between Chomsky's universalgrammar and moral principles, the role of emotions in moral beliefs, moral disagreements, thesemantics of moral language, and moral responsibility.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong isProfessor of Philosophy and Hardy Professor of Legal Studies at DartmouthCollege.Contributors to volume 2: Fredrik Bjorklund, James Blair, PaulBloomfield, Fiery Cushman, Justin D'Arms, John Deigh, John Doris, Julia Driver, Ben Fraser, GerdGigerenzer, Michael Gill, Jonathan Haidt, Marc Hauser, Daniel Jacobson, Joshua Knobe, Brian Leiter,Don Loeb, Ron Mallon, Darcia Narvaez, Shaun Nichols, Alexandra Plakias, Jesse Prinz, GeoffreySayre-McCord, Russ Shafer-Landau, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Cass Sunstein, William Tolhurst, LianeYoung Philosophers and psychologists discuss new collaborative work in moral philosophy that draws on evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience. Autorid: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong